INSURANCE IN ITS RELATION TO THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION.
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the United
States provides that "the Congress shall have power
to regulate commerce with foreign Nations and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes." The object of
this paper is to consider what relation, if any, insurance, as
carried on by corporations of one state with the people of
other states, bears to "commerce among the several states."
As the solution of this question depends, first, upon the meaning of the words "commerce among the several states," and
second, upon the nature of insurance, the subject will be
discussed under these heads.
i. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE.
It is an interesting fact that at the beginning of the present century-several years after the adoption of the Constitution-there was nothing deserving of the title "commerce among the several states." The various scattered
colonial communities received from abroad whatever necessaries were not produced in their immediate vicinities.
Travel from one colony to another was burdensome and infrequent. We read that when the national government was
removed from Philadelphia to Washington its goods were
sent down the river in a frail bark, and the President and his
wife, proceeding by land, were lost in the woods beyond Baltimore. The Alleghany mountains constituted an almost
insurmountable barrier between what was then known as
the East and the West. In spite of this, however, the jealousies which had already existed between the colonies, their
selfishness towards each other, and the frequent discriminations by one colony against another, warned the framers of
the Constitution that if there ever should be commerce
among the several states it must be regulated by the national
government.
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In the consideration by the Supreme Court of this part of
the commerce clause, it has never been even suggested that
the words bear less than their usual signification. That
court has, however, in certain cases, given them a larger
meaning than ordinarily attaches to them. In order to intelligently apply these decisions of the Supreme Court to our
subject, it is desirable to first briefly consider the usual or
common signification of the words "commerce among the
several states."
"Commerce" is defined to be "interchange of goods, merchandise or property of any kind." It is trade or traffic
and includes the instrumentalities of trade or traffic.
"Among," if standing alone, might be broad enough to be
construed within or throughout. In the connection, however, in which it is used, this construction is impossible and
must be limited. "Among the several states" evidently
means between the several states.
The word "states" seems perhaps more indefinite than
either the words "commerce" or "among." Woolsey in his
"Introduction to International Law," Section 36, defines a
state to be "a community of persons living within certain
limiiits of territory, under a permanent organization, which
aims to secure the prevalence of justice by self-imposed law."
The uncertainty attaching to the word "states" arises from
the fact that it is sometimes popularly used to indicate certain portions of land contained within given geographical
limits. This conception of the word is as narrow as it is
inaccurate. The state is, in reality, the whole people of one
body politic. When we further consider that the body politic
is not organized for the purpose of engaging in commercial

transactions, but that such transactions occur between the individuals who constitute the body politic, we may conclude
that commerce between the several states means commerce
between an individual or individuals of one state and an individual or individuals of another state. In short, the
obvious intent of the commerce clause is not to draw
geographical lines as such, but to protect persons, viz., the

persons of one state against the jealousies, selfishness and
discriminations of other states.
The usual and common signification of the phrase "com-
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merce among the several states" appears therefore to be an
exchange of property between the people of one state and
the people of another state or other states. As already remarked, it has never been held that the phrase should be
limited within a narrower scope, but, on the coz'--Ary. its
meaning has been somewhat enlarged by the Supreme Cohrt.
Whenever this clause has been presented to it, the Supreme
Court has been obliged to consider directly whether a particular statute is a regulation of commerce, which indirectly
raises the question whether the subject-matter of the statute
is commerce. General broad definitions of the word "commerce" are nothing more than dicta except in so far as the
definition was necessary to the decision of the case in which
it was given. As to these dicta, however, it should be noted
that even in them there have been no suggestions that the
words of the commerce clause bear less than their usual signification. Consequently, we approach the cases which decide secondarily what is meant by "commerce among the
several states," but primarily what constitutes a regulation
of that commerce, in order to ascertain to what extent, if
any, the Supreme Court in determining the latter has added
to the ordinary meaning of the former.
Before proceeding in this it is interesting to note the
historical fact as set forth by Messrs. Prentice and Eagen in
their exhaustive and useful work upon this clause, page 14,
that for thirty-five years after the framing and adoption of
the Constitution, no case involving the extent of this power
arose in the Federal Supreme Court. "Before the year
184o," the text continues, "the construction of this clause had
been involved in but five cases submitted to the Supreme
Court of the United States. In 186o the number of cases
in that court involving its construction had increased to
twenty; in 1870 the number was thirty; by 188o the number
had increased to seventy-seven; in 189 ° it was one hundred
and forty-eight; while at the present time" (1898) "it is
not less than two hundred and thirteen. In the State Courts
and United States Circuit and District Courts the progress is
not less significant. In 184o this clause of the Constitution
had been involved in those courts in forty-eight cases only.
In 186o the number had increased to one hundred and sixty-
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four; in 187o it was two hundred and thirty-eight; in 188o
it was four hundred and ninety-four; in 1890 it was eight
hundred, while at the present time" (1898) "it is nearly
fourteen hundred." And the authors remark that "such
a history as this can, it is believed, find its parallel in no other
branch of constitutional law. To this field has been transferred
in large part the modem battle of states' rights.
More significant than all, we find here in the majority of
cases the element of discriminationby one state against another, showing that the old Hellenic appetite which found its
satisfaction in the commercial chaos of the Confederation
has been neither extinguished nor slaked." The purpose of
the commerce clause being to prevent this discrimination, it
will, wherever possible, be given a construction equal to the
accomplishment of that purpose.
The cases which relate to the regulation of interstate commerce arise upon two lines of legislation,-state and national. In almost all cases the regulation out of which the
complaint grows has not been directly of commerce itself,
but of one or more of the instrumentalities of commerce.
Commerce is the exchange of property, while its instrumentalities are the means by which that exchange is effected.
Consequently, the Supreme Court has been called upon to
consider, first, whether the commerce clause is broad enough
to include the instrumentalities of commerce, and second, in
each case, with few exceptions, whether or not the particular
regulation before it is a regulation of an instrumentality.
This distinction is an important one, and should not be lost
sight of in a discussion of the matter before us, which directly raises the question as to what relation insurance bears
to commerce itself, irrespective of its instrumentalities, as
well as suggests, possibly, the further question, whether or
not insurance is also an instrumentality of commerce.
It is with the first question that we are at present concerned.
In order, however, to understand the exact position which
the Supreme Court has taken, it is necessary to consider
a few of the leading cases that deal with the regulation of
the instrumentalities of commerce before considering those
which directly decide whether or not a particular transaction
or line of transactions constitute commerce itself.
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The discussion was opened by the leading case of Gibbons
v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. i. In his opinion delivered in that case,
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, than whom there has never been
an abler expounder of the Constitution, defined in unmistakable terms the broad and liberal spirit in which the instrument is to be interpreted. Upon this subject he said: "This
instrument contains an enumeration of powers expressly
granted by the people to their government. It has been said
that these powers ought to be construed strictly. But why
ought they to be so construed? Is there one sentence in the
Constitution which gives countenance to this rule?
If they contend for that narrow construction which, in support of some theory not to be found in the Constitution,
would deny to the government those powers which the words
of the grant,as usually understood,import,and which are consistent with the general views and objects of the instrument;
for that narrow construction, which would cripple the government, and render it unequal for the objects for which
it is declared to be instituted,and to which the powers given,
as fairly understood, render it competent; then we cannot
perceive the propriety of this strict construction, nor adopt
it as the rule by which the Constitution is to be expounded.
As men whose intentions require no concealment generally
apply the words which most directly and aptly express the
ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who
framed our Constitution, and the people who adopted it,.
must be understood to have employed words in their natural
sense, and to have intended what they have said.
We know of no rule for construing the extent of such powers, other than is given by the language of the instrument
which confers them, taken in connection with the purposes
for which they were conferred. .
"The subject to be regulated is commerce; and our Constitution being, as was aptly said at the bar, one of enumeration, and not of definition, to ascertain the extent of the
power, it becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the
word. The counsel for the appellee would limit it to traffic,
to buying and selling, or to the interchange of commodities,
and do not admit that it comprehends navigation. This
would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects,
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to one of its significations. Commerce, undoubtedly, is
traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts
of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing
rules for carrying on that intercourse.

.

.

.

The word

used in the Constitution, then, comprehends, and has been
always understood to comprehend, navigation within its
meaning; and a power to regulate navigation is as expressly
granted as if that term had been added to the word 'commerce. "
In the above quotation Mr. Chief Justice Marshall has indicated the error of limiting a general term, applicable to
many objects, to one of its significations. The regulation of
commerce is undoubtedly the regulation of traffic or trade or
exchange directly. In the sense in which the phrase is used
in the Constitution, however, it includes something more,
viz., the regulation of the instrumentalities of traffic or trade
or exchange. In short, the word "commerce," with reference
to its regulation, expresses the commercial intercourse between the parts of our nation, which may thus be regulated
by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse as well
as rules directly regulating what we have before referred to
as commerce itself; but more often by the former, as in the
statute passed upon in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden.
It was held in that case that certain laws of New York
which granted to two men the exclusive right to navigate all
the waters within the jurisdiction of that state, with boats
moved by steam or fire for a term of years, amounted to a
regulation of commerce. And while the language of Mr.
Chief Justice Marshall might, at first glance, suggest that
he intended to enlarge the common significance of the commerce clause, yet considered in relation to the question before
the court, it merely amounts to an authoritative declaration
that, as navigation is one of the necessary instrumentalities
of commerce, the regulation of it is a regulation of commerce. Every complete commercial transaction consists of
a number of dependent parts, and in so far as any of the
latter are regulated, there is to that extent a regulation of
commerce. If, for instance, transportation constitutes part
of a commercial transaction, a regulation of the transporta-
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tion is a partial regulation of commerce. Likewise of all
other parts of the transaction.
The principle just referred to has been recognized and reasserted in many cases to which, with one exception, reference need not now be made. The case of the PensacolaTelegraph Company v. The Western Union Telegraph Company,
96 United States I, illustrates the extent to which the principle enunciated in Gibbons v. Ogden may be carried. An
act of Congress declared that the erection of telegraph lines
should, as against state interference, be free to all who
might accept its terms and conditions, and that a telegraph
company of one state should not, after accepting them, be
excluded by another state from prosecuting its business
within her jurisdiction. A subsequent statute of the State
of Florida granted to the Pensacola Telegraph Company
the exclusive right of establishing and maintaining lines of
electric telegraph as therein specified. This statute was held
to be in conflict with the act of Congress, and therefore inoperative against a corporation of another state entitled to
the privileges which that act conferred. The question
whether or not the telegraph is an instrumentality of commerce was determined in the affirmative. Upon this subject
Mr. Chief Justice Waite said: "Since the case of Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. i, it has never been doubted that commercial intercourse is an element of commerce which comes
within the regulating power of Congress. Post-offices and
post-roads are established to facilitate the transmission of intelligence. Both commerce and the postal service are placed
within the power of Congress, because, being national in
their operation, they should be under the protecting care of
the national government.
"The powers thus granted are not confined to the instrumentalities of commerce, or the postal service known or in use
when the Constitution was adopted, but they keep pace with
the progress of the country, and adapt themselves to the new
developments of time and circumstances. They extend from
the horse with its rider to the stage coach, from the sailing
vessel to the steamboat, from the coach and the steamboat to the railroad, and from the railroad to the telegraph,
as these new agencies are successively brought into use to
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meet the demands of increasing population and wealth.
They were intended for the government of the business to
which they relate, at all times and under all circumstances.
As they were intrusted to the general government for the
good of the nation, it is not only the right, but the duty, of
Congress to see to it that intercourse among the states and
the transmission of intelligence are not obstructed or unnecessarilyencumbered by state legislation."
The long line of cases, of which the foregoing are illustrations, hold that commerce may be regulated by the regulation of its instrumentalities, and determine what those instrumentalities are. This brings us to a consideration of another line of cases which treat directly of what constitutes
commerce itself. This line is as short as the other is long.
For our purpose only two need be cited. The first undoubtedly enlarges the usual and common signification of the commerce clause. In the Passenger Cases, 7 Howard, 283, it was
held that a state law which required the masters of vessels,
engaged in foreign commerce, to pay a certain sum to a state
officer, on account of every passenger brought from a foreign
country into the state, or before landing any alien passenger
in the state, was inoperative by reason of its conflict with
the commerce clause of the Constitution. After referring to
a dictum of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, Mr. Chief Justice McLean says: "The transportation of
passengers is regulated by Congress. More than two passengers for every -five tons of the ship or vessel are prohibited, under certain penalties; and the master is required
to report to the collector a list of the passengers from a
foreign port, stating the age, sex and occupation of each,
and the place of their destination. In England, the same
subject is regulated by act of Parliament, and the same thing
is done, it is believed, in all commercial countries. If the
transportation of passengers be a branch of commerce, of
which there can be no doubt, it follows that the act of New
York, in imposing this tax, is a regulation of commerce. It
is a tax upon a commercial operation,-upon what may, in
effect, be called an import. In a commercial sense, no just
distinction can be made, as regards the law in question, between the transportation of merchandise and passengers.
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For the transportation of both, the ship-owner realizes a
profit, and each is the subject of a commercial regulation by
Congress. When the merchandise is taken from the ship,
and becomes mingled with the property of the people of the
state, like other property, it is subject to the local law; but
until this shall take place, the merchandise is an import, and
is not subject to the taxing power of the state, and the
same rule applies to passengers. When they leave the ship,
and mingle with the citizens of the state, they become subject
to its laws."
This decision enlarges the meaning of the word "commerce," which ordinarily implies an exchange of property.
We have seen that it may have many instrumentalities, of
which one is transportation and another the telegraph. A
regulation of all transportation in a certain locality must be
a regulation of commerce in that locality, as it prohibits, except under given circumstances, the use of this instrumentality. Transportation, however, might be employed in
other than commercial transactions, involving no exchange
of property. The mere moving of property is not commerce
in the common acceptation of that word, nor is the moving
of men. When, therefore, the Supreme Court states that
"in a commercial sense no distinction can be made" (as regards the law before it) "between the transportation of
merchandise and passengers," it enlarges to that extent the
meaning of the word "commerce." In view of the fact that
transportation has grown to be such an important agency
of commerce, there is sometimes an inclination to confuse
the terms and regard them as being about synonymous. It
is well, therefore, to bear in mind that the Supreme Court
has, in consideringwhat is a regulation of commerce, merely
extended the meaning of the word to include within its scope
something in addition to, but not in limitation of its ordinary
signilcation-anexchange of property.
Whether or not the effect of the Passenger Cases is to insert the word "transportation" into the commerce clause by
substituting the words "commerce and transportation" for
the word "commerce" is a question which we are not at present called upon to discuss.
In Paul v. Va., 8 Wallace, 168, it was held that a state
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statute which enacted that no insurance company, not incorporated under the laws of the state passing the statute,
should carry on its business within the state without previously obtaining a license for that purpose, and that it
should not receive such license until it had deposited with
the treasurer of the state bonds of a specified character, to
an amount varying from thirty to fifty thousand dollars, according to the extent of the capital employed, was not in
conflict with the commerce clause of the Constitution.
The following argument was made on behalf of the appellant: "The business of insurance is commerce. It is intercoursefor the purpose of exchanging sums of money for
promises of indemnity against losses. The term 'commerce'
as used in the Constitution has been authoritatively construed to have a signification wide enough to include this
subject." The appellant rested his case on the question
whether or not an exchange of a sum of money for a promise
of indemnity-regarding this as being in itself the substance
of the transaction-is commerce. Of course, the court answered the question in the negative, and based its decision
upon its answer.
Mr. Justice Field said: "The defect of the argument lies
in the character of their business. Issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce. The policies are
simply contracts of indemnity against loss by fire, entered
into between the corporations and the assured, for a consideration paid by the latter. These contracts are not
articles of commerce in any proper meaning of the word.
They are not subjects of trade and barteroffered in the market as something having an existence and value independent
of the parties to them. They are not commodities to be
shipped or forwarded from one state to another, and then
put up for sale. They are like other personal contracts between parties which are completed by their signatureand the
transfer of the consideration. Such contracts are not interstate transactions, though the parties may be domiciled in
different states. The policies do not take effect-are not
executed contracts-until delivered by the agent in Virginia.
They are, then, local transactions, and are governed by the
local law. They do not constitute a part of the commerce
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between the states any more than a contract for the purchase
and sale of goods in Virginia by a citizen of New York
whilst in Virginia would constitute a portion of such commerce."
It is to be noted here that the court does not hold that exchange of property is not commerce, nor does it hint at a
limitation of the ordinary signification of the commerce
clause. It merely decides that making a contract (of insurance) is not a transaction of commerce, because that contract is not an article of commerce in any proper meaning of
the word, and that such contracts are not interstate transactions because they are not executed until delivered by the
agent. In this case the wrong question appears to have been
presented to the court by the counsel for the appellant. A
contract is an agreement to do or not to do a certain thing.
No contract is an article of commerce in any other capacity
than as a piece of paper. It may or may not be an instrumentality of commerce, according to the circumstances in
which it is employed. The question which should have been
presented to the court is whether or not the thing contemplated to be done by the contract of insurance, irrespective
of the form of the contract or the manner of its execution,
is commerce. A contract to make an exchange of wheat is
not an article of commerce; but wheat is such an article, and
its exchange is commerce. Likewise, a contract to make an
exchange of money is not an article of commerce, but money
is such an article. Its exchange is commerce, and as we have
already seen, whatever regulates that exchange or its instrumentalities is a regulation of commerce.
The logic employed in Paul v. Va. is that the insurance
business consists in an exchange of a contract for money,
and that as a contract is not an article of commerce, the exchange is not commerce. If, however, the insurance business as transacted at the present day is something more; if
it is not in substance the exchange of money for a contract,
but consists in what is contemplated by the contract, irrespective of the manner in which the contract is executed,
the case of Paul v. Va. has no further application. What,
then, is the nature of insurance?
Before leaving Paul v. Va., which has been treated in sev-
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eral later cases as a precedent without being discussed, it may
be well to add that the insurance business must be regulated
by legislation either of Congress or of the states. If Congress
has the right to regulate it, or any part of it, and is silent,
it must be regulated by the states in the exercise of the police
power. Owing to the magnitude of the business, to which
reference shall be made later, the security of policy-holders
requires strict supervision. Therefore, even if Congress may
act in the matter, public policy requires that until Congress
does act, the states shall protect insurance policy-holders by
adequate legislation. As Congress has not acted, such legislation as that passed upon in Paul v. Va. is not at the present
day in conflict with the commerce clause of the Constitution.
This brings us to a consideration of
2. THE

NATURE OF INSURANCE.

In Biddle on Insurance, page I, is the following: "The
general term insurance is applied to two species of contract:
insurance in respect of property and insurance in respect of
life, which are not analogous in their elements, and which
proceed upon different principles. Insurance in respect of
property may be defined as an agreement by the insurer for
a consideration to indemnify the insured against loss, damage or prejudice to certain property that may be during a
certain period sustained by reason of specified perils to
which the property may be exposed.

.

.

.

Though

insurance in respect of property is technically a contract of
indemnity, it is not, strictly speaking, intended necessarily
to be an absolute indemnification of the insured nor to place
him in precisely the same position he occupied before the
loss, but the indemnity intended is simply the repayment to
the insured of so much of the insured subject matter as is
lost at an estimated value or at its then market value.
The earlier form of insurance in England was probably marine; then came life, and in 1635 'estates combustible'
were insured, and latterly a great variety of perils have been
insured against, as injury from lightning, explosions, storms
or tornadoes, breakage of plate-glass windows, whether in
transit or in place; the dishonesty or infidelity of servants
or officials, and also the liability of -a contractor to pay for
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injuries to his workmen. Insurance in respect of life, which
is substantially the purchase by the insured from the insurer
of a reversionary interest for a present sum of money, may
be defined to be an agreement by the insurer to pay to the
insured or his nominee a specified sum of money, either on
the death of a designated life or at the end of a certain
period, provided the death does not occur before, in consideration of the present payment of a fixed amount, or of an
annuity till the death occurs or the period of insurance is
ended.

.

.

Life insurance is not in any sense a con-

tract of indemnity." The same authority says further on
page 12: "The last essential element of the contract is a consideration, or, as it is usually termed, the premium. This, ordinarily, is money, though no reason is observed why it must
necessarily be so; for a contract of insurance would no doubt
be perfectly valid where the consideration agreed to be paid
was otherwise than in money, as, for instance, an insurance
may be in exchange for goods, or in consideration of work
and labor done, or in payment of rent or for any other
valuable consideration."
Insurance in respect of property is therefore an agreement
to pay to the insured the value of so much of the insured
subject matter as is lost, and insurance in respect of life is
an agreement to pay the insured or his nominee a specified
sum of money upon the happening of a certain event. In
the former, the event upon which the payment is to be made
may or may not happen; in the latter the event will happen,
but at an indefinite time. In one case the uncertainty attaches to the event, while in the other it attaches to the time
of the occurrence of the event, but in all lines of insurance
the substance of the agreement is to pay. The form of the
contract may or may not be one of indemnity. It may be
expressed in a great variety of forms. Different contracts
may have numerous individual peculiarities, but it is not with
the form we have to do, it is with the substance. Every contract of insurance is an agreement to pay, for which there is
a sufficient consideration. Such being the substatice of the
contract, the final object of insurance, or of the insurance
business, is an exchange of property. This fact stands out most
clearly, perhaps, in life insurance, where A. delivers annually
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to B. a certain amount of property, and B. in return, at a
given date, or upon the happening of a given event, delivers
to A., or his appointee, a certain amount of property. The
property generally consists of money. In fire insurance A.
delivers to B. a certain amount of property, and B., upon
the happening of a specified contingency, delivers to A. a certain amount of property. That the contingency never
happen does not alter the fact. The chief object of the business of fire insurance is to deliver the property upon the
happening of the contingency. In other words, while a fireinsurance contract is a conditional one, the substance of the
business of fire insurance is not that the insurer will pay,
but that he does pay upon the happening of the fire. This
is equally true of all other lines of business in which contracts are employed. The contract of insurance contemplates an exchange of property between the insured and the
insurer, and vice versa, and that exchange, not the contract,
is the real business of the insurer. The usual discrepancy
between the amount of premium and the amount of indemnity in other than life insurance is, of course, accounted
for by the presence of conditions in the contract.
An examination of other branches of the business of insurance will show that in them all its object is an exchange
of property in the form of money. At the office of the insurer we see premiums flowing in from all parts of the country, and payments on account of losses flowing out, the whole
business being transacted through the medium of contracts
or policies of insurance.
No large insurance company confines its operations within
the limits of any one state, but extends its business into all
parts of the country. In fact, a large portion of the business
of most insurance companies is with persons residing in
states other than those of their respective domiciles. The
regulation of the business of these companies has become an
important matter, and is intimately connected with the interests of all policy-holders. Every state has enacted legislation upon this subject, with an utter disregard of the
legislation of the other states, and of such a character as to
show clearly that the old Hellenic appetite "has been neither
extinguished nor slaked."
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In an excellent paper entitled "Significant Factors in National Regulation of Insurance," read before the National
Convention of Insurance Commissioners at Detroit, in I899,
Mr. Max Cohen said: "A recent tabulation issued by the
National Board of Fire Underwriters shows that fifteen
states have anti-compact laws, twenty-one have anti-rebate
laws, ten prohibit the use of the co-insurance clause, seven
require special deposits from insurance companies, thirty
have resident agent laws, twenty have valued policy laws
and thirty-one retaliatory laws."
A specific instance of the nature of present insurance
regulation is afforded by the laws of New Mexico, which
require an insurance company organized outside of that state
to deposit ten thousand dollars, cash (without interest), in
the state or some county treasury, or in lieu thereof, bonds
of the United States, or of that state, or of some county
thereof, and invest its surplus in the same, or, "other indebtedness of any solvent dividend-paying institution, incorporated under the laws of the territory, or of the United
States." There could be but one object of such legislation,
and that is to market by force securities and "indebtedness of
any solvent dividend-paying institution incorporated under
the laws of the territory," which ought to be viewed with
suspicion by every conservative investor. Under this law
the surplus of a company authorized to do business in New
Mexico could be invested in the mining stocks of some "wildcat company" of that state, and be solvent. If, however,
this surplus be invested in the first mortgage gold bonds of
a leading railway company of another state, the insurance
company is declared by the laws of that state to be insolvent
and unable to pay its indebtedness. Comment is unnecessary.
In his paper, from which a quotation has already been
taken, Mr. Cohen stated the following relative to the recent
growth and present proportions of the insurance business:
"A faint conception of the magnitude of the insurance business, and its essential scope for the needs of the people, may
be obtained from this brief outline of but two of its most
important branches-life and fire. Over thirteen million
people are policy-holders in life-insurance companies and as-

732

INSURANCE

IN ITS RELATION TO THE COMMERCE

sociations, and nearly two million hold benefit-certificates in
the fraternal orders conducting life-insurance features. Of
this total of fifteen million policies, nine million were issued
by the industrial life-insurance companies alone, and are now

held by the toilers in the nation's workshop for the protection
of their families. And these fifteen million of policies represent an aggregate of over thirteen billion dollarsin outstanding life insurance. The amount of risks annually written
and carried by the fire-insuranceinstitutionsfor the protection of property and industriesin the United States amount
to over nineteen billion dollars."
The total volume of our national currency was reported
on September i, 19oo, to be $2,096,683,042.

As fire in-

surance is at the present day only one branch of the insurance
business, we may from the figures given above derive a fair
idea of the enormity of that business.
It is impracticable within the scope of this paper to refer
to all the evils incident to the regulation by state legislatures
of the business of insurance carried on with the people of one
state by corporations of another. They are such, however,
as to make national regulation of this business an urgent
need. That Congress has not power to institute and impose
such regulation has never been held; and upon the basis of
our examination it seems not improper to assume, until a
contrary decision shall have been rendered by the Supreme
Court, that Congress has this power. When we consider
the common signification of the words "commerce among
the several states," and find that judicial interpretation has
not served to limit, but rather to enlarge, that common signification; and when we bear in mind that the essence of that
portion of the insurance business we are considering lies
in an exchange of property between the citizens of one state
and an insurance corporation of another, it can hardly appear illogical to attempt to argue that insurance should be
included within -the term "commerce among the several
states." If this be true, and the commerce clause shall be
held to vest in Congress. the power to regulate this business
as well as those other branches and instrumentalities of commerce carried on among the several states, it is submitted
that, as suggested by the language -of Mr. Chief Justice
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Waite above quoted, it is not only the right of Congress,
but its duty, to see to it that the business of insurance among
the states is not obstructed nor unnecessarily encumbered by
state legislation.
Reginald H. Ines.

